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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
LAUREN ASHLEY KILLEEN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45888
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-42208

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Lauren Ashley Killeen pled guilty to one count of felony eluding. She received a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed. Ms. Killeen contends that her sentence represents
an abuse of the district court’s discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
At approximately one o’clock in the morning on September 16, 2017, officers stopped a
car driven by Lauren Ashley Killeen for an equipment violation. (Presentence Investigation

1

Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.) After giving the officer her vehicle registration, Ms. Killeen
turned her car back on and rapidly drove away. (PSI, p.3.) In driving away, Ms. Killeen crossed
into oncoming traffic and drove through multiple red lights. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Killeen did not have
her car’s headlights on when she drove away from the officers. (PSI, p.3.)
Ms. Killeen was charged by information with felony eluding. (R., pp.24-25.) Pursuant to
a plea agreement, Ms. Killeen pled guilty to felony eluding. (Tr., p.17, Ls.11-16; p.19, L.1 –
p.20, L.8; R., pp.46-59.) According to the terms of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to
file a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p.12, Ls.3-5; R., pp.49, 58-59.) The
district court accepted Ms. Killeen’s guilty plea and ordered a PSI and set the matter for
sentencing. (Tr., p.31, L.22 – p.32, L.11.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of five years, with two years fixed.
(Tr., p.36, Ls.5-10.) Ms. Killeen’s counsel asked that she be referred to drug court, but if not,
counsel recommended a unified sentence of three and one-half years, with one-half year fixed.
(Tr., p.37, Ls.5-7; p.38, Ls.7-9.) The district court sentenced Ms. Killeen to five years, with two
years fixed.2 (Tr., p.43, Ls.14– 18; R., pp.63-66.)
Ms. Killeen appeals from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.68-70.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Killeen to a unified sentence of
five years, with two years fixed, following her plea of guilty to felony eluding?

1

Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, including the original PSI, the Addendums to the PSI, evaluations,
and letters submitted in support of Ms. Killeen.
2
Ms. Killeen also filed a motion for reconsideration of the sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35, which
was denied without a hearing because it contained no new information. (R., pp.67, 73-78.)
2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Killeen To A Unified Sentence
Of Five Years, With Two Years Fixed, Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Felony Eluding
Ms. Killeen asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of five years,
with two years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Killeen does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Ms. Killeen must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of Ms. Killeen’s rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing her excessively. The district court failed to consider the fact that Ms. Killeen has the
support of her family, suffers from mental illness as well as addictions to heroin and
methamphetamine, and was truly remorseful. Ms. Killeen has substantial support and, with
programming, Ms. Killeen could likely be successful in the community.
Ms. Killeen has a supportive family. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595
(1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his family and employer in his
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rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988)
(reducing sentence of first-time offender who had a family depending upon him for support and
who accepted responsibility for the offense at issue), overruled on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295
(1990). Ms. Killeen’s mother and grandmother were both in the courtroom at sentencing to
show their support for her. (Tr., p.42, Ls.6-10.) Ms. Killeen’s parents wrote a letter of support
to the court for its consideration at sentencing.

(Tr., p.42, Ls.6-10; PSI, pp.380-381.)

Ms. Killeen’s sister is a good source of support for her and wrote a letter to the court in which
she describes Ms. Killeen as “intelligent, smart, open minded, creative, and hard working.” (PSI,
p.382.) Ms. Killeen also has a young child. (PSI, pp.9.) She values her family and one of her
goals is to strengthen her relationship with her three-year-old son. (PSI, p.13.) Ms. Killeen also
has a supportive friend who wrote a letter to the court for its consideration. (PSI, p.38.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing the defendant to commit the crime and the
suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme
Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981). Ms. Killeen realizes that she is addicted to methamphetamine and heroin. (PSI, pp.12,
61.) In fact, Ms. Killeen was suffering from withdrawals when she was pulled over, and she
believes she would not have committed the crime had she been sober. (PSI, pp.4, 60-64.)
However, Ms. Killeen wants treatment and her goal is to stay sober. (PSI, pp.13-14.) At
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sentencing, Ms. Killeen told the court that she wanted treatment for her drug addiction and
mental health issues. (Tr., p.39, Ls.8-15.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial
court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999). Ms. Killeen reported a history of mental illness including Depression, Anxiety,
and PTSD. (Tr., p.9, Ls.3-6; PSI, pp.11, 33.) She believes she would benefit from medication to
manage her mental health conditions. (PSI, pp.11, 14.)
Further, Ms. Killeen expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for her acts. At
sentencing, Ms. Killeen said:
I would like to take this moment to take full accountability for my poor decisions
in committing this crime of eluding.
...
I would like to apologize to the community of Boise and truly I’m just thankful
that no one was injured or hurt during this time – during the time this crime took
place. By committing this crime, it is very clear to me and I need and would
benefit from a very structured treatment program for my drug addiction and
mental health issues. Also that I will have to continue helping myself for the rest
of my life if I want to win this battle against my addiction and stop going back to
prison by staying free, clear, and abstinent from all drugs and alcohol.
I still have not lost all hope and faith in myself to overcome this battle against
myself. I would like to thank you for listening, and thank my mother and my
grandmother for showing up and supporting me in my sentencing here today.
Thank you.
(Tr., p.38, L.24 – p.39, L.21.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant
expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). For example, in
Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the defendant has
expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept
treatment and other positive attributes of his character.” Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209. In Shideler,
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Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from his poor mental and
physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with
his remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of
armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a crime.

Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the court reduced Shideler’s sentence

from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed
twelve years. Id. at 593. Ms. Killeen’s circumstances are somewhat similar to the facts of both
Alberts and Shideler in that she recognizes that she has an addiction to controlled substnaces, she
wants treatment for her substance abuse, she has been diagnosed with mental health conditions,
and she showed considerable remorse for her actions.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Killeen asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her. She asserts that had the district court
properly considered her mental health conditions, family support, controlled substances
addictions, and her remorse, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Killeen respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 5th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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